13 Feb 02

The Gallipoli Invasion, Turkey, March-August, 1915

By 1915, what would eventually be called World War I had already dragged on far longer than anyone expected. Archduke Francis Ferdinand had been assassinated in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Now, nearly a year later, the Germans had scored a string of impressive victories, but a decisive victory continued to elude them, and would forever. Casualties, particularly among the French, had gone off the scale. Commanders, struggling to update their tactics, saw their terrified men killed and maimed by the thousands, not, as in past wars, by enemy soldiers, but by machinery. There had been wars in Europe before, but not since Napoleon had Europe seen itself so completely conflagrated. This War, that had been welcomed by many as a "great patriotic adventure," had deteriorated into a stagnant, self-perpetuating, pitiless massacre that showed no signs of ending.

Winston Churchill would later say of the period, "... events passed largely outside the scope of conscious thought. Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of tragedy, swaying and staggering forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-increasing scales, until injuries were wrought to the very structure of human society which a century will not efface and which may well prove fatal to the present civilization."

All sides were mesmerized by the stagnated trenches of the Western Front in Europe. They repeatedly persuaded themselves that, with just "one more push," the enemy's line could be broken, a breakthrough could be established, and they could then rush to the enemy's rear. But, months came and went, and no breakthrough happened, despite innumerable attempts. Infantry charges that had worked in previous wars was not working now, not against machine guns and rapid-fire rifles and artillery.

In this atmosphere, politicians were under increasing pressure to "end the war" any way it could be done. To that end, Winston Churchill and Lord Kitchener, Britain's Secretary of War, suggested opening a second front to distract the Germans from the European campaign. As always, Churchill was persuasive, and it was thus decided to launch an amphibious invasion of Turkey's tiny, twenty-by-five-mile Gallipoli Peninsula and then drive north and capture the Dardanelles Straight, the only water access to the Black Sea. This would separate Turkey (who had allied itself with Germany and Austria in 1914, sealing off the Black Sea and Russian ports therein) from the Central Powers and open Russia's Black Sea ports once again, so that Russia could be provided with desperately needed military supplies and then pressure the Germans on the eastern side. The Turkish army was casually dismissed as third rate and hopelessly outdated. They could never stand up to a modern fighting force. It all looked good on paper.

British Admirals opposed the invasion plan from the beginning, the first part of which would involve British war ships blasting their way up the Dardanelles Straight toward Istanbul and the Black Sea. The straight was narrow and treacherous and had been heavily mined by the Turks. Turkish shore batteries also presented a significant threat. Not wanting to risk their best and newest ships, the admirals assigned a number of old ships, manned mostly be reserve crews. Less than half the number of ships deemed minimally necessary actually took part.

On Thursday, 18 March 1915 the naval operation began. The Turks were not as impressed with the British Fleet as everyone thought they would be. Shore batteries were shelled, but they gave as well as they received. Shocked, the British fleet withdrew. Minesweepers (actually fishing trawlers, manned by civilians) were then sent in but were quickly chased back out. The British fleet then reentered the straights, only to lose one ship outright and have several others severely damaged by mines. They limped back out again. That was the end of that! British naval invincibility had received a severe setback, and the admirals were determined that it not get any worse. The naval portion of the invasion was unilaterally called off. The land assault should have been called off too, but the commander, General Birdwood, was sure he could secure the peninsula within a matter of days and destroy the Turkish shore batteries from the land side, making it possible for the naval invasion to be revived. As with his naval counterpart, Birdwood had at his disposal fewer than half the troops considered minimally necessary. Birdwood was superseded by General Ian Hamilton at the last minute. Hamilton, long retired, was an old-time friend of Kitchener's. Hamilton never went ashore. He attempted to run the whole show from one of his ships.

British Invasion forces assembled in Egypt. Many Australian and New Zealand units were included. Added while in Egypt was the "Assyrian Jewish Refugee Mule Corps," the first all-Jewish unit to be involved in active combat since the Jerusalem campaign in 70AD. Colonial troops were always used in England's marginal military operations, preserving the best native British units for the main show, back in Europe. Security was poor. The locals immediately learned the target of the invasion would be Gallipoli and passed the information on to the Turks. Mustapha Kemal, the brilliant and inspiring Turkish commander, lost no time preparing Gallipoli for the arrival of the British. The ill-fated amphibious assault began early Sunday morning, 25 April 1915.

Two main landing areas were selected, the Cape in the South (Cape Helles) and ANZAC (for Australia/New Zealand Army Corps) Bay thirteen miles up the coast. A later landing was made a Sulva Bay, further north. All involved long beaches met abruptly by steep bluffs. The landing operation quickly deteriorated into a disorganized shambles. Naval gunfire preparation was random and skimpy. British officers used outdated tourist maps they had picked up in Egypt. They proved all but useless. Landing craft were little more than slow-moving, towed barges. German-equipped Turkish gunners were waiting and hit the British the moment they arrived on shore. Some beaches were stormed unopposed, but most bogged down immediately. Australians at ANZAC Bay got ashore and drove inland, but a determined Turkish counterattack drove them back to the beach.

British forces secured the cape but made little progress up the peninsula. The ANZAC Bay contingent never got off the beach. No British units ever got close to the shore batteries on the Straight. Months passed, punctuated by poorly coordinated and disastrously fruitless offensives. A massive Turkish counterattack on 19 May was blunted with heavy Turkish casualties. On the offensive, the Turks fared no better than the British. By August, the situation had deteriorated into stagnant, trench warfare, reminiscent of Europe. On 25 May, the British ship Triumph was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. That was the last straw for the British fleet. It immediately departed for Greece, leaving the landing force with no naval support.

In October, Hamilton was finally fired and replaced by General Sir Charles Monro. After arriving at Gallipoli and seeing for himself the hash Hamilton had made of things and knowing no additional resources would be forthcoming, Monro recommended a complete, unilateral withdrawal. Personally visiting the scene shortly thereafter, Lord Kitchener, reluctantly concurred. The withdrawal started in December and was completed early the next month. By 9 Jan 1915, the Turks woke up to find themselves alone on the peninsula, the British having all departed on ships in the night. The withdrawal was actually the only successful part of the entire operation! Well planned and seamlessly executed, it went so smoothly that astonished Turks never knew what was going on until they inadvertently discovered that all British positions were unoccupied.

With an adequate commitment, the invasion could have been successful. Deficiently supplied, the Turks were pushed to the breaking point and could have not held out much longer, but the British gave in first. The Turks to this day consider their victory over the British on that tiny peninsula to be a centerpiece of their national history.

The invasion was thus an unqualified military failure and a staggering disaster, arguably the most catastrophic of the War. Ten thousand dead British, Australian, and Dutch soldiers (twenty times that many wounded), and nothing had been accomplished. It would stand as Britain's worst military fiasco of the Twentieth Century until being eclipsed by the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in January of 1942. It nearly ended Winston Churchill's young political career. It would later be said, "Nowhere during the entire War was such conspicuous gallantly so foolishly and uselessly squandered as it was at Gallipoli." Turkish losses can only be estimated, but probably exceeded 200,000. As with all its military blunders, the British quickly forgot all about Gallipoli. As it turns out, they forgot too soon and too fast, because they would repeat the catastrophe, chapter and verse, with their ill-fated invasion of Dieppe, France in August of 1942, a mere twenty-seven year later.

The Gallipoli Invasion was the first significant military activity to take place on the small peninsula since Greek General Miltiades fought Darius' Persian forces there in 500BC. None has taken place since.

Kemal went on to become Turkey's first president, changing his name to Ataturk. Birdwood and Monro went on to fight other battles. Hamilton went back into the retirement he never should have left.

What would eventually end World War I would be Germany's fascination with her submarine fleet. America had been neutral, but, after several American ships were sunk by German submarines (most notably the Lusitania on 7 May 1915), then President Wilson decided to send American troops to Europe. After being so badly worn down by the British and French, the Germans had no capacity to resist dozens of fresh American divisions, which began arriving in Europe in June of 1917. By this time, the British had also introduced the tank, which brought mobility back to trench warfare. It was all too much for the Germans. Backed into a corner, they sued for peace. The Great War ended officially on 11 Nov 1918 , but not for long. The resulting poorly-thought-out armistice insured that exactly twenty-one years later, the Second World War would begin, involving all the same players!

Lessons: Military side shows are never allocated the resources necessary for success. They nearly always fail. Generals and admirals will never risk significant resources, or their personal reputations, on a military afterthought. Second-string commanders are always assigned, along with, in the case of the British, colonial troops, Australians at Gallipoli and Canadians at Dieppe.

Disasters, as well as victories, need to stay in our collective memory. Repeating victory is always expected. Repeating disaster is always unforgivable.

We westerners tend to be impressed with ourselves. We look upon all other cultures as being made up mostly of unsophisticated hicks. When we allow ourselves to think that way, we set ourselves up for catastrophe!

/John

13 Feb 02

This is from a LEO friend in Alaska on the subject of shotguns rusting in car trunks:

"We discovered ‘Corrosion X' It is an aviation product, for rust prevention and removal. You'll find it at an aviation supply house. Once we started wiping down the shotguns with Corrosion X, they just stopped rusting. Hasn't been a problem since"

/John