28 Nov 02

More on military rifles from another international friend:

"Additional problem: The design of the bolt and extractor of the AR15/M16 is inherently defective The extractor spring (no matter what material is used) will predictably fatigue and break at 1,500 rounds, although the rifle may continue to function normally. This persistent problem has been extensively studied by the Pentagon. The 'solution' has been to add a rubber 'D' ring to the spring. Even when the spring weakens and/or breaks, the rubber continues to insure complete extraction. This is what all serious operators use, but the problem has hurt international sales ARs.

My brother has just arrived in Kiev, Russia. He reports that the new Russia n AN94 is a good and functional rifle. Most African countries are now buying Russian small arms. Price, durability, and ease of use are big draws. At less than one hundred dollars per copy (including four magazines) no western rifle comes close to the AN94. Russian rifles are rude and crude (by wester n standards), but they are designed to function continuously despite poor conditions and perpetual lack of maintenance. In fact, the durability of South African Rs (South African copy of the Israeli Galil), Russian AK/ANs, and the French FAMAS far outrun that of American ARs. This fact is common knowledge and is surely not lost on the world's arms buyers."

/John

28 Nov 02

"Victory Disease," Overcoming heavy odds at Blood River (Dutch-Zulu War, 1838) and Majuba Hill (First Anglo-Boer War, 1881)

In the Eighteenth Century, Dutch settlers on the South African Cape, like so many other European colonists, swiftly developed a sincere dislike for the British. The British had an annoying habit of making second-class citizens out of all non-British. The British, of course, knew local Dutch farmers lacked the political sophistication to develop the area into a legitimate economic entity. The British were also interested in displacing German influence in the area, so they were not about to pack up and leave. The indigenous Khoisan (Bushmen) were scattered and disorganized. Unlike the ferocious and cunning Iroquois and other Indians in North America, they provided little effective resistance to European settlers. Even the fierce (and well organized) Bantu, coming down from the North and West, were unable to overcome the overwhelming European advantages of the mounted infantryman, the rifle, and the "lager" (a circle of wagons).

Dutch settlers called themselves "Boers." The term translates to "farmer." The British used the term also, but to them it meant "pig."

Many Dutch left the Cape for the South African interior. Others pushed eastward up the coast. All wanted to get out of the reach of British influence. In fact, the "Great Treck," starting in 1836, took on a profound religious significance with the Dutch. They were convinced that the British had been sent by the devil to harass them (British soldiers did wear red uniforms, after all), as they regarded themselves as having been favored by God.

Their beliefs were bolstered at the Battle of Blood River in December of 1838, where Dutch "Voortrekkers" decisively defeated a large Zulu (Bantu) army. Their commander, Andrius Pretorius, cleverly set up a defensive lager in the elbow of the Blood River, frustrating the classic Zulu double envelopment. The tiny Dutch contingent could have easily been wiped out, but was instead victorious. They all took this as a divine sign that their presence in the interior of South Africa was sanctioned from on high.

Between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of WWI, there were only seven years when British soldiers were not actively engaged in a foreign war. British soldiers have always been excellent fighters. As with the Romans before them, their ability to function as a coordinated team was matched in few other armies. However, British soldiers have never been excellent, or even respectable, marksmen. Individual marksmanship among British infantrymen has always been poor, and still is to this day. Individual marksmanship was never considered important to British commanders. To them, a military unit that is so cohesive that it moves and functions as a single entity was far more important than individual competence with weapons.

In stark contrast, The "army" put together by Dutch farmers in South Africa couldn't have been more different. Dutch religious views made it impossible to have an officer corps, as each man considered himself the equal of every other. So, officers and NCOs were elected and only served in their position so long as their "subordinates" kept them there. Obeying orders was optional, as each man served as a volunteer. He could leave and go home any time he wanted. No one was paid. Thus, large, coordinated military movements, such as an infantry, bayonet charge, were unlikely, because commanders knew many of their men would consider the order stupid and refuse to take part. There was no infantry/calvary coordination, as all Boers reported for duty mounted on their own horses. Their "army" was all cavalry! There were no uniforms either. Except for a cartridge across their chest, they all looked like civilians. I all sounded pretty disorganized, but, under the Boer system, dithering buffoons did not stay in positions of command for long, and there was no mercenary attitude. Everyone was there fighting for his home and way of life. As hunters and frontiersmen, Boers were masters of camouflage and stalking. They were hard to locate and harder yet to fix in position.

The British considered the whole thing laughable. Any such disorganized mob would be quickly brushed aside by a professional army. They were in for a surprise, and the First Anglo-Boer War would signal the world that, as would be repeated during the Russo-Japanese War (1904), a small, but agile and highly motivated military force, armed and trained with modern weapons, could handily defeat a much larger force that was unwieldy, outdated, overextended, armed with obsolete weapons, indecisively lead, and most of all, arrogantly overconfident.

Because Boers were all mounted, they moved quickly. They lived off the land, so they didn't require long, vulnerable supply lines. They had the irritating habit of suddenly appearing where no one expected them and just as suddenly melting away as if they had never been there. Their ability to move without being detected was uncanny and was the subject of many exasperated comments by British commanders.

Most importantly, each and every Boer was a suburb rifleman. Having subsisted by hunting native planes game all their lives, poor marksmanship would not be found with any of them. Rifles were not issued. Every man brought his own, and they were never shared. To a Boer, his rifle was his most important personal possession, and it was always well maintained, close at hand, and kept in a high state of readiness. Rifles stayed with their owners at all times. They were never gathered up in stacks or locked away in buildings, as was common procedure with the British.

Their ability to hit, and hit consistently, at extended ranges was something the British had never had to deal with before. British infantrymen were no match for them. Boer riflemen could hit effortlessly at ranges where a British soldier would never even attempt a shot. And, Boers were masters of cover and concealment. They would always fire from expertly camouflaged positions. Precious little was ever exposed. Thus, volley after volley thrown back at them by ranks of British soldiers had scant effect.

Boers inherently disliked all governmental trappings characteristic of Western Civilizations (for which the British were so well known), like multilayered bureaucracies, committees, and endless meetings. They made decisions quickly, with a minimum of discussion. Accordingly, when superior military equipment became available, they didn't dither, they acquired it as fast as they could. A company in England, Westley-Richards, began making a revolutionary breech-loading rifle beginning in the 1860s. It was an improvement of the American Peabody Rifle and, in turn, influenced the British Martini-Henry Rifle, which was eventually adopted by the British (as always, too late for it to make any difference).

With the Westley-Richards breechloader, Boer riflemen could dramatically increase their rate of fire over the that of muzzle loaders that the new rifle replaced. This capability made them essentially invulnerable to bayonet and cavalry charges which formed the very foundation of British tactical doctrine. In addition, metallic cartridges were not as susceptible to environmental deterioration as was loose gunpowder, caps, and balls. There was nothing not to like, so, without hesitation, Boers acquired good quantities of Westley-Richards Rifles immediately upon them becoming available and used they with devastating effect during the First Anglo-Boer War, which began in 1880 and lasted less than a year. By the time the British followed suit (with the Martini-Henry), Boers were acquiring the new, and vastly superior Mauser rifle, just in time for the Second Boer War, which began in 1899!

In 1852, the British, recognizing the potential problems associated with armed conflict with Dutch settlers who had fled to the South African interior, extended autonomy to Boers who had settled beyond the Vaal River (the Transvaal). Autonomy was also given to those settled between the Orange and Vaal Rivers, who promptly claimed the title of "The Orange Free State." In the years following, neither "state" ever emerged significantly from anarchy. When they couldn't pay their bills, Britain reannexed them. Both were promptly invaded by high-handed British bureaucrats. Predictably, by 1880, anti-British riots were out of hand, and Boer farmers organized into mobile military units (called "commandos"), began seizing British outposts by force.

Things came to a head when a British infantry column, dispatched late in December of 1880 to reinforce the garrison at Pretoria, was ambushed at a river crossing called Bronkhorst Spruit. A single Boer messenger, under a white flag, commanded to column to turn back. The column dithered. A crescendo of gunfire suddenly erupted from carefully concealed positions on the column's flank. British troopers fell like dominos. One hundred and twenty of them were hit within two minutes. Few ever saw the enemy. Fewer still even got off a single shot. Most died at the scene, including the British commander Colonel Anstruther. The Boers, with their new Westley-Richards breech loaders, lost only two. The First Anglo-Boer War had well and truly begun!

Back in the Cape Colony, British General George Colley was informed of the Bronkhorst disaster on Christmas Day. He was furious! He was also fearful that peace would break out before he could have his revenge on the brazen and impudent Dutch. Without delay, he organized a regimental-sized expeditionary force and started north to confront the Boers directly. He found them sooner than he expected! At a narrow pass in the Drakensburg Mountains called Laing's Nek, he confronted a large Boer commando, led by Peit Joubert. Apparently forgetting that the enemy was now armed with rapid-fire, breech-loading rifles, Colley assaulted them with a volley, followed by a bayonet charge. The charge never got close to any of the Boer trenches. Once again, British troopers were gunned down wholesale. Colley lost over three hundred men within minutes and was forced to withdraw. A short time later, leading a new force, Colley met disaster afresh at a plateau called Schuin's Hoogte, where, once again, accurate Boer rifle fire from covered positions decimated both his infantry and artillery crews. Again, he was forced to withdraw, this time abandoning both his wounded and his big guns.

Colley was now even more determined to defeat the Boers, in order now to avenge the triple disasters at Bronkhorse and more recently at Laing's Nek and Schuin's Hoogte, where he had been personally in command. In February of 1881, Colley let six hundred men up Majuba Hill in the dead of night. Majuba Hill commanded a vast area that Colley believed he could dominate with artillery. This time, he took the Boers by surprise. He was firmly in position on the summit before any Boer realized it. Eighty Boers volunteered to assault the hill and dislodge the British force, which was four times their number! They had no artillery, and the slope was too steep for horses. No one would have given them much of a chance of success, but, fearless, they went forward anyway.

Majuba Hill is actually a small, volcanic mountain with a crater at the top. On the rim of the crater, are three high points, all of which the British occupied. Many British soldiers were Gordon's Highlanders, fresh from fighting in Afghanistan. Imagine their surprise when several dozen Boers suddenly stood up and fired at them from just outside their perimeter. The Boer commando had snuck into range virtually undetected. Forty Scots dropped dead nearly at the same instant. The rest wavered, then ran! Many were picked off as they scurried toward the hill occupied by Colley and his staff. Colley was advised to make a bayonet charge, but, remembering Laing's Nek, decided to wait until the Boers charged. He would then give them a volley and overrun them.

The Boers never charged. They never even stood up. They just maneuvered and fired from covered positions. British soldiers continued to fall. Return fire was ineffective. Colley himself finally stood up to rally his troops. Instantly, a bullet struck him in the head, and he fell, lifeless, to the ground. Over two hundred British troops were killed that day. Nearly all were wounded. The Boers suffered one killed and five wounded! The British army was in shock. No one dreamed such a thing was possible.

As a result of Colley's quadruple disaster, the Transvaal was again granted independence, but the agreement was unworkable, and a second Anglo-Boer War would break out eighteen years later. This time, the Boer's luck would run out.

Lesson: As we say are the poker table, "Don't mistake good cards for brains." Unlikely victories, particularly in combination, can cause some to think they can't lose, or that God won't allow them to lose. It's called "victory disease," and it is nearly always fatal. Seasoned warriors know the bad always comes with the good. In poker, winners are not the ones who get dealt good hands. They are the ones who play the poor hand well.

/John

28 Nov 02

State of police training. From a friend who just attended a police training course. Attendees were all working, patrol officers, ranging from rookie to veteran:

"The good news is that accuracy was acceptable in most cases, and most officers displayed a healthy, learning attitude. Here is the bad news:

100 % did not incorporate lateral movement into their pistol draw, stoppage reduction, reloading procedure, or firing sequence. This matter improved by only 10%, even after movement was taught and recommended.

40% consistently looked at their holsters during the reholstering process.

20% panned their support hand with their muzzle during the draw sequence and during reholstering.

20% were apparently comfortable holstering an empty weapon after completing each exercise, even though they knew they were on a hot range.

100% failed to look all the way behind them after firing and prior to reholstering.

75% failed to scan to any degree before reholstering. 40% were unable to reduce a stoppage quickly.

30% 'scooped' their pistols during the draw (sometimes called bowling')

75% of the students equipped with pistols with decocking levers were unable to decock rapidly using only their strong hand thumb. In many cases, these officers struggled and dithered every time they tried to decock."

Lesson: We're a lot better than we used to be, but we still have many training challenges that must be overcome. All trainers need to work diligently on the above issues.

/John