13 May 03

New Rifles from RA:

Alex Robinson of Robinson Arms in Salt Lake City informs me that they will be manufacturing two new rifles before the end of the year. Neither will be on a Kalashnikov , Garand, or FAL model.

One will be chambered for 7.62X39 Soviet and will use AK47 magazines. The other will be chambered for 308 and will use either FAL and/or M14 magazines.

These rifles, if the prove to be as reliable at the existing RA-96, will be a great boon to mankind, and I'll report on them just as soon as I get my hands on one.

/John

13 May 03

Eighty-seven years before the current Gulf War: British Soldiers in Basra and Kut, April 1916

In 1915, there was no nation of Iraq. Iraq did not become a sovereign nation until 1932. All of Mesopotamia was then part of Turkey, and its inhabitants were all "Turks." Turkey had allied itself with Germany after the Great War broke out, and England suddenly had a direct interest in oil and oil pipelines in what was now enemy territory. All the real action was, of course, in France and other parts of Western Europe, but military backwater campaigns, such as this one in Mesopotamia and the ill-fated and simultaneous Gallipoli Invasion (also against the Turks) were seen as critical to the success of overall war effort. Unfortunately, as with most military sideshows, both campaigns proved disastrous debacles.

Sir Charles Townshend had gained minor notoriety in 1895 when his command held out for two months against native tribesman at Chitral on the western Indian frontier. Despite his personal ambition (noted by all who knew him), his reputation still did not suffice to get him assigned to a line unit in the main battle area in Europe with the onset of the War. In fact, his disappointment at being shunted off to a military backwater like Mesopotamia was the subject of many bitter conversations with contemporaries.

However, trying to make the best of a disappointing assignment, Townshend, with his British 17th Infantry Brigade, charged northward from Basra, up the Tigris River. Turkish resistance was weak and disorganized. Turkish units mostly retreated without firing a shot. Within a month, Townshend was already halfway to his goal, Baghdad, with only light casualties. In mid-1915 British victories elsewhere were scarce, so, when the news reached England, Townshend became an instant hero.

Noting Townshend's success, the German Kaiser sent Field Marshall Colmar van der Goltz to organize the Turkish resistance and defend Baghdad. Van der Goltz was no amateur! Immediately, and for the first time, Townshend encountered effective resistance at Kut as he resumed his march north. He also started taking significant casualties. Kut was finally taken, but at a heavy price.

Townshend's superior, General Nixon (back in Basra) apparently jealous of Townshend's success, did little to support the advance. He obviously did not want to see the arrogant Townshend promoted. Fresh troops and supplies were thus not moving north.

Townshend continued pushing north anyway, as far as the ancient Persian battlefield of Ctesiphon (affectionately called "pissed upon" by his troops). Ctesiphon had marked the southern limit of the ancient Roman Empire (under General Belisarius) many centuries before. Ctesiphon, as fate would have it, was also to mark the northern extreme of the British advance. Turkish resistance was now so heavy, that for Townshend to continue on to Baghdad without substantial reinforcements, was out of the question. Townshend had no choice but to fall back.

At this point, Townshend's contemporaries note that he began to suffer a nervous breakdown. With a great "Victory at Baghdad" now a rapidly fading fiction, Townshend's hoped-for "place in history" began fading away too. His overblown personal vanity couldn't handle it. As a result, Townshend began to fall apart mentally.

The smart thing to do would have been to retreat all the way back to Basra, which could be accomplished in relative safety and with comparative ease. Once there, Townshend could consolidate, reinforce and resupply, get competent medical care for his many casualties, and confront Nixon face to face. However, Townshend's faltering ego wouldn't allow such an ignominious retrace of his once-glorious advance. He unwisely decided to dig in at Kut, where he was quickly surrounded by Turkish forces. The possibility of significant resupply and reinforcement was expeditiously eliminated by the Turks. Townshend naively thought he could hold out at Kut until he was relieved by a column coming north from Basra. Salvaging his personal reputation now occupied him completely. Perhaps the newspapers in London would make him a hero after all, comparing him to Gordon at Khartoum.

No such luck! Adopting the tactic of slow strangulation, the Turks brought in German artillery and began what they calculated would be a long siege. Townshend's sanity deteriorated rapidly. He became giddy and whimsical, secluding himself most of the time and issuing conflicting and illogical orders on the rare occasions when he came out. He should have been relieved. He made no effort to break out from Kut, and an overdue relief column from Basra, despite heavy casualties, was unable to break through from the other direction.

On Saturday, 29 April 1916, Townshend surrendered his entire command at Kut to the Turks. Townshend's men subsequently endured a brutal captivity in Turkish POW camps. Most, succumbing to starvation, disease, and murder at the hands of Turks, did not survive to return to England. Townshend himself was meanwhile wined and dined in Constantinople as a guest of the Turkish government (who apparently regarded him an intriguing curiosity), all the while caring nothing for the lot of his men.

Townshend was eventually returned to England where he vainly attempted, for the rest of his life, to justify his conduct. His attempts fell on deaf ears, particularly those of the few survivors of his ill-fated command.

Lesson: Personal vanity has ultimately disgraced the careers and reputations of more than one commander. Custer, Townshend, and Percival all suffered from "delusions of grandeur" so burdensome that they literally lost their minds when they saw it fading away. A sound mind carefully combines humility and audacity. Tilt too far in either direction, and disaster awaits, as we see from the forgoing.

/John

13 May 03

Eighty-seven years before the current Gulf War: British Soldiers in Basra and Kut, April 1916

In 1915, there was no nation of Iraq. Iraq did not become a sovereign nation until 1932. All of Mesopotamia was then part of Turkey, and its inhabitants were all "Turks." Turkey had allied itself with Germany after the Great War broke out, and England suddenly had a direct interest in oil and oil pipelines in what was now enemy territory. All the real action was, of course, in France and other parts of Western Europe, but military backwater campaigns, such as this one in Mesopotamia and the ill-fated and simultaneous Gallipoli Invasion (also against the Turks) were seen as critical to the success of overall war effort. Unfortunately, as with most military sideshows, both campaigns proved disastrous debacles.

Sir Charles Townshend had gained minor notoriety in 1895 when his command held out for two months against native tribesman at Chitral on the western Indian frontier. Despite his personal ambition (noted by all who knew him), his reputation still did not suffice to get him assigned to a line unit in the main battle area in Europe with the onset of the War. In fact, his disappointment at being shunted off to a military backwater like Mesopotamia was the subject of many bitter conversations with contemporaries.

However, trying to make the best of a disappointing assignment, Townshend, with his British 17th Infantry Brigade, charged northward from Basra, up the Tigris River. Turkish resistance was weak and disorganized. Turkish units mostly retreated without firing a shot. Within a month, Townshend was already halfway to his goal, Baghdad, with only light casualties. In mid-1915 British victories elsewhere were scarce, so, when the news reached England, Townshend became an instant hero.

Noting Townshend's success, the German Kaiser sent Field Marshall Colmar van der Goltz to organize the Turkish resistance and defend Baghdad. Van der Goltz was no amateur! Immediately, and for the first time, Townshend encountered effective resistance at Kut as he resumed his march north. He also started taking significant casualties. Kut was finally taken, but at a heavy price.

Townshend's superior, General Nixon (back in Basra) apparently jealous of Townshend's success, did little to support the advance. He obviously did not want to see the arrogant Townshend promoted. Fresh troops and supplies were thus not moving north.

Townshend continued pushing north anyway, as far as the ancient Persian battlefield of Ctesiphon (affectionately called "pissed upon" by his troops). Ctesiphon had marked the southern limit of the ancient Roman Empire (under General Belisarius) many centuries before. Ctesiphon, as fate would have it, was also to mark the northern extreme of the British advance. Turkish resistance was now so heavy, that for Townshend to continue on to Baghdad without substantial reinforcements, was out of the question. Townshend had no choice but to fall back.

At this point, Townshend's contemporaries note that he began to suffer a nervous breakdown. With a great "Victory at Baghdad" now a rapidly fading fiction, Townshend's hoped-for "place in history" began fading away too. His overblown personal vanity couldn't handle it. As a result, Townshend began to fall apart mentally.

The smart thing to do would have been to retreat all the way back to Basra, which could be accomplished in relative safety and with comparative ease. Once there, Townshend could consolidate, reinforce and resupply, get competent medical care for his many casualties, and confront Nixon face to face. However, Townshend's faltering ego wouldn't allow such an ignominious retrace of his once-glorious advance. He unwisely decided to dig in at Kut, where he was quickly surrounded by Turkish forces. The possibility of significant resupply and reinforcement was expeditiously eliminated by the Turks. Townshend naively thought he could hold out at Kut until he was relieved by a column coming north from Basra. Salvaging his personal reputation now occupied him completely. Perhaps the newspapers in London would make him a hero after all, comparing him to Gordon at Khartoum.

No such luck! Adopting the tactic of slow strangulation, the Turks brought in German artillery and began what they calculated would be a long siege. Townshend's sanity deteriorated rapidly. He became giddy and whimsical, secluding himself most of the time and issuing conflicting and illogical orders on the rare occasions when he came out. He should have been relieved. He made no effort to break out from Kut, and an overdue relief column from Basra, despite heavy casualties, was unable to break through from the other direction.

On Saturday, 29 April 1916, Townshend surrendered his entire command at Kut to the Turks. Townshend's men subsequently endured a brutal captivity in Turkish POW camps. Most, succumbing to starvation, disease, and murder at the hands of Turks, did not survive to return to England. Townshend himself was meanwhile wined and dined in Constantinople as a guest of the Turkish government (who apparently regarded him an intriguing curiosity), all the while caring nothing for the lot of his men.

Townshend was eventually returned to England where he vainly attempted, for the rest of his life, to justify his conduct. His attempts fell on deaf ears, particularly those of the few survivors of his ill-fated command.

Lesson: Personal vanity has ultimately disgraced the careers and reputations of more than one commander. Custer, Townshend, and Percival all suffered from "delusions of grandeur" so burdensome that they literally lost their minds when they saw it fading away. A sound mind carefully combines humility and audacity. Tilt too far in either direction, and disaster awaits, as we see from the forgoing.

/John