28 Nov 03

A missed opportunity to alter the course or world history, never to present itself again, Nakma Chu, India, 1962

The Himalayas have been disputed territory for centuries. When Communists took over in China at the end of WWII, thousands of Tibetans (we'll never know how many) were displaced and ultimately murdered. To the South, newly independent India's Nehru became progressively nervous, as Communist China also made territorial claims to large parts of its northern frontier. The warm and fertile plains of India were tempting military objectives and would make a welcome addition to Chinese national dominion, and the Chinese knew it was all ripe for the picking!

With no roads in the area, India's northern frontier posts could only be reinforced and resupplied by helicopter, and the high altitude limited carrying capacity of each sorty to barely more than a thousand pounds. Airdrop was the only other option, and the mountainous terrain and high winds made that a dubious proposition indeed. Significant reinforcements would have to get there by foot from lower altitudes.

Assignment to these posts was considered punishment. Living conditions were wretched. Acclimatization to high altitudes took weeks, so troops were rarely rotated. Pulmonary disorders and temperature casualties regularly reduced manpower to far below published levels. Radio communication with headquarters at lowers altitudes was sporadic and unreliable. Maneuvers were rare, as troops had only individual weapons (rifles and pistols). There were no machine guns, mortars, or artillery. Indian troops mostly huddled in shacks and tried to stay warm. By contrast, corresponding Chinese posts were amply supplied via all-weather roads. Hardwire communication was all-inclusive, and manpower was more than adequate. Patrols and other maneuvers were constant and aggressive, and Chinese troops were well equipped with crew-served, as well as individual, weapons and were backed by artillery.

However, China's Mao Zhe-dung, after being surprised by America's unexpected resolve on the Korean Peninsula, was concerned about British (and, by proxy, American) military involvement if he made an overt territorial grab on India's northern edge. On the other hand, he had no fear of a dithering Nehru and his bumbling administration, and, based on the Korean experience, he was pretty sure that Americans lacked the will to use nuclear weapons.

By the early 1960s, Nehru, trying desperately to be taken seriously by the Western Powers, decided to take a stand (of sorts) against provocative Chinese intrusions. Unfortunately, Nehru's "army" was completely outclassed, in every way, by the Chinese. As noted above, India's frontier posts were remote, poorly manned, and miserably equipped. Nehru's pitiable forces had no chance against the well equipped Chinese, but Nehru, relying on fraudulently optimistic reports manufactured by his generals (who, like generals everywhere, were afraid to tell him the untidy truth), pushed the issue anyway, issuing empty threat after empty threat, hoping to get Mao to back off. The stage was set!

On 10 October 1962, Nehru's general Kaul was personally sent to the area and commanded to "throw out" Chinese troops from disputed territory. Kaul's "strategy" was to have a company of his men march in the open, past Chinese positions, and defiantly "sit" behind them. In an attempt to execute that plan, hapless Indian troopers made it only a few meters forward before being annihilated in less than a minute by an amused, dug-in Chinese battalion. Kaul was boggled! He immediately got aboard the nearest helicopter and deserted the area, muttering that he had to "consult" with higher command. He never returned. On 20 Oct, hoards of Chinese troops, supported by artillery, effortlessly overran one Indian position after another. They were met with virtually no resistance, as thousands of fleeing Indian soldiers were killed and captured.

There was silent panic when the news reached New Delhi, as all the fiction about India's military prowess began to unravel. Newly arriving reinforcements, rushed to the area, were all deposited at low altitude and instructed to clime, on foot, to the area under siege. All quickly succumbed to altitude sickness and the cold. The few that actually arrived had inadequate clothing and only a few rounds of ammunition. It quickly became obvious that there would be no significant reinforcement and thus no credible resistance.

With his new nation on the verge of being swallowed up, Nehru issued a plaintiff call to Britain and the United States to come to his aid. Nehru now knew the dysphoric truth. Without immediate foreign intervention, he could not stop, or even slow down, the Chinese. But, even as intervention was being contemplated, the Chinese suddenly withdrew back to their original positions. The crisis was apparently over.

Mao was advised that the point had been made, and that risking confrontation with Britain and the United States was too big a gamble. It was a colossal and costly miscalculation on Mao's part! Mao had little to fear from either the British or the Americans. By the time British and American forces could be mobilized and transported to India (assuming they could even make a decision to come to Nehru's aid), the invasion would have been over, and China would be in the process of consolidating its new territory. After begging America not to use nuclear weapons in Korea, it would be the height of hypocrisy for Britain to urge their use in India.

In the early 1960s, China could have easily annexed all of India at virtually no cost, citing, correctly, that India had started it. By the grace of God, they missed their chance!

Lesson: Any political leader who believes, without question, what his generals tell him is a fool! Nearly all military disasters are preceded by overly optimistic, indeed fictional, reports, promulgated by generals who are interested only in keeping their jobs. Digesting the lumpy truth is always more difficult than gulping down smooth lies. But in the end, lies, smooth or otherwise, always unravel. If you rattle the saber often enough, someone will call you bluff. When they do, you better not be bluffing!

/John