07Aug04

An unhappy note from a friend and trainer in the federal system:

"In my office there are currently 250 special agents. Most carry whe n they are not working, but the typical attitude toward off-duty carrying is casual

and nonchalant. Most who do carry off duty do not carry extra magazines, blades, a second gun, a flashlight, handcuffs, or OC. There is a persisten t attitude that carrying a firearm is an occupational requirement for duty on ly. Indeed, most applicants I see coming into the system have had no exposure t o real fighting. This is a tough group to convince that it is likely they wi ll some time have to aggressively defend their own life, but will be unable to , because it was 'a pain in the ass' to carry off-duty.=80

Comment: As the world continues to deteriorate, attitudes among cops, all cops, need to toughen. We all need to carry guns (and necessary accouterments), all the time. We police need to get serious about our char ge and our place in history, or find something else to do!

"If you are unwilling to defend even your own lives, then you are like mice

trying to 'negotiate' with owls. You regard their ways as 'wrong.' They regard you as dinner."

/John

07Aug04

Comments on "Dinner," from one of my instructors:

"It is natural for young people to think well of themselves, but the y are too often tempted into the false belief that a high level of 'show ' performance in training or competition makes them 'tough,' whatever the y perceive that term to mean. What can we do to make them really ready?

Years in the martial arts form my frame of reference, and ten years of intense focus on shooting skills have not altered my opinion. Almost all instruction, training, and practice should be on basics. I think elaborate training scenarios and competition such as IPSC and IDPA are much like 'tour nament' karate. They are not a completely irrelevant, but they attract shallow, self-centered individuals who lack the character and seriousness of purpose to practice basic drills diligently. Most are far more interested in gadgets than in personal enlightenment.

I think people are better trained to win fights when someone says, =80 Go practice one thousand draws.' Mine is, like yours, a minority view, of course."

Comment: Some sage advice from Attila the Hun:

"If victory is always easily gained, you must reconsider the worthiness of your ambitions."

/John

07Aug04

Nicephorus and the Kahn:

Romans lumped all eastern Europeans into one category and called them Slavs . The term means "slaves." When the Roman Empire split into Eastern and Western components in 395AD, the Western half failed to survive another hun dred years, but the Eastern Empire (Byzantium), with its capitol at Constantinople, stayed intact well into the Second Millennium.

Wiley Emperor Nicephorus I had his hands full in the year 811AD. A muscula r and well organized Slavic tribe, the notorious Bulgars, under Kahn (king) Krum, were constantly, and successfully, raiding his territory. Like Vikin gs further north, Bulgar warriors were skillful and cunning, and the entire Bulgarian "economy" depended upon them successfully raiding their upscale neighbors to the southeast. Slavs weren't "Christianized" u ntil the tenth century. In 811 they were pagan and thus considered barbarians by Nicephorus and hi s Byzantines, who were Roman and Christian.

Nicephorus decided that, in a single stroke, he would solve two of his biggest problems. He would personally lead an army into Bulgar territory confronting and defeating Krum in his own land. In the process, he would t ake all his nobles of dubious loyalty with him, insuring that they would not engine er an overthrow during his absence.

Nicephorus' army was large and imposing. It included great strength in all categories, including a complement of siege engines, capable of breaching a ny fortification. Krum was completely outclassed, and he knew it. Nonetheless, he looked for a way defeat Nicephorus. Ultimately, he found i t!

But, he didn't find it before Nicephorus sacked and burned the Bulgarian capitol city of Pliska in July of 811. Pliska was so completely demolished , to this day it has never been rebuilt. However, Krum's army was still mostly intact, and Nicephorus knew his mission was still unfulfilled. However, Nicephorus' uneasiness was not shared by his commanders who thought the war was over. They were persuaded that their columns could now casually march thro ugh the remainder of Bulgaria as a signal to the defeated Bulgars that they bet ter not cause any more trouble for their neighbors. As a result, normal military precautions, like thorough reconnaissance, were neglected. Krum t hus succeeded in luring a foolish and overconfident Nicephorus into a trap, a t rap where both his numerical and technical superiority would be neutralized.

Nicephorus suddenly found himself in a steep-sided valley, with no exit, save where he entered. Just as suddenly, he discovered his only exit block ed by a hastily constructed log barrier. Nicephorus and his entire staff were astonished to realize their entire army was trapped, and their only chance was to reverse direction and break through the log barrier. Now Nicephorus =99 true weakness and incompetence as a commander became evident to all. Fearful of

failure and the resultant loss of personal prestige, Nicephorus dithered, unable and unwilling to give the decisive order. His commanders implored h im to make a decision, but he was so griped by fear that he became giddy, incoherent, and hopelessly despondent. Their siege engines could have easi ly broken down the barrier, but the order never came.

Krum gave Nicephorus several days, then he suddenly swept down upon the Byzantines from the surrounding hills. Lacking decisive leadership, the en tire Byzantine army was overwhelmed and destroyed. Only a few escaped. Nicepho rus himself was killed, the first Roman emperor to be killed in battle since Valens, who was killed at the disastrous Battle of Adrianople in 378AD.

Nicephorus' son, Stauricius, also at the battle, escaped, only to di e from his wounds several months later. Stauricius' successor, Michael, su ffered a similar defeat at the hands of Krum the following year. Indecisive leaders hip and political intrigue had proved disastrous, twice within a twelve months.

Lessons: Who just "lets things happen," because he is afraid of making a mistake, is almost certainly making one. Who incessantly "fears to f ail" will, in the end, fail without even trying.

Boldness and daring are traits found in every true leader, but rarely found

in a typical "manager." One can't manufacture loyalty. It must be earned. You can't "manage" men into battle. You have to lead them!

/John