04Aug06

A Bridge "Too Far."

With Montgomery's North African victory at El Alamein on 4 November 1942, air superiority restored over England by the RAF (and thus Hitler's amphibious invasion of the island nation indefinitely postponed), and the entire German Eastern Front not only at a standstill at Stalingrad but progressively surrounded by Zhukov, the tide in Europe had clearly turned against Hitler.

Spectacularly successful Allied amphibious landings at Normandy in June of 1944 marked the beginning of the end. Thereafter, military commanders, on both sides, saw Allied victory as inevitable and looked only for ways to " shorten the War." Operation "Market Garden,=80=9D Bernar d Montgomery's brainchild, was sold on that basis. A brilliant and daring initiative, hastily thrown together, Market Garden, had large Allied paratroop units, idle since D-Day and itching to get back in the fight, dropping in and seizing critical bridges,

well behind disintegrating German lines. An Allied armored vanguard would then rush across the Rhine (an otherwise substantial obstacle) and into Germany proper. Caught off guard, retreating Germans would have no choice but to surrender, entire divisions at a time! The war in Europe would end within weeks! Market Garden was, in fact, to be the largest Airborne operation in the history of warfare, before or since.

Neither Bradley nor Eisenhower liked the Plan, considering it dangerously lacking in contingency planning, too consumptive of critical resources, too much of an over-reach, and too assumptive of German impotence. However, the prospect of significantly "shortening the War" ultimately pr oved too seductive to be resisted. Both subsequently regretted ever allowing the Operation to

go forward.

Bernard Montgomery, flush from his stunning success at El Alamein (his firs t and only victory), excitedly briefed his staff on 10 Sept. Lt General Fred

Browning was the one who pointed out that the cornerstone of the entire Pla n, and the most ambitions of its components, the road bridge over the Rhine at

Arnhem in occupied Holland, was over sixty miles behind existing German lines. Concerned about his men's ability to hold out until relieved by advancing Allied units, he commented to Montgomery that it might indeed be a =80 bridge too far!" That was, of course, exactly what Montgomery didn't want to hear. In fact, Montgomery didn't want to hear any of a good deal of disturbing intelligence. The "Plan" was too far along!

Jumps commenced on schedule, 17 Sept 1944, and things went south almost immediately. On paper, the Plan was breathtaking, but it hinged entirely o n surprise and delay-free execution, and delays plagued the Operation from the start! Inadequate numbers of aircraft meant that jumps could not be made simultaneously, and, at the last minute, drop zones were changed to areas m iles away from objectives in order to avoid ground fire. Resulting delays gave the German high command time to correctly guess what the Allies were up to. Ge rman capabilities and determination had been inexcusably underestimated by Montgomery, and the swiftness and enthusiasm of the German response had bee n underestimated by everyone!

Lt Col John D Frost's, 2nd Bn, British Parachute Regiment, 1st Bri tish Airborne Division arrived at the Arnhem Bridge and, according to plan, entr enched themselves on the north approach. There, Frost's men doggedly held out, resisting repeated attempts by Germans to break through, frustrating the Ge rman high command's efforts to use the bridge in order to respond to oth er Allied movements. Unknown to Montgomery's planners, an entire German tank division was resting and refitting in Arnhem when the Operation began!

Several times, Frost's untenable position was pointed out to him by the opposing German commander who offered terms of surrender, but Frost, even wh en himself badly wounded, refused, vowing to continue the costly battle. Howe ver, with ammunition nearly gone, with reinforcement no longer a possibility, an d overwhelmed with wounded, Frost's few remaining able-bodied troops surrendered on 20 Sept.

American General James Gavin, himself a hero in another sector of the battlefield, described the heroic stand of Frost and his battalion at Arnhem as the "finest of the entire War." Seven months later, Allies woul d reach Arnhem once more and cross the Rhine for the final time.

Casualties among American, British, and Polish Airborne units were monstrous, as was loss of equipment, and loss of momentum. Thousands were taken captive by the Germans. Far from shortening the War, the Market Garden deb acle actually stalled the Allied advance and delayed the ultimate German surrend er. Montgomery did his best to put a good face on Market Garden, but most historians regard the operation as a disaster and a significant, and inconv enient, German victory, their last of the War. Montgomery, narcissistically unapologetic to the end, referred to Market Garden as "ninety perce nt successful." Few agreed with him, least of all Dutch Prince Bernhard, who responded bitterly, "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery ' success!'"

In 1977, Dutch residents of Arnhem renamed the structure "John Frost Bridge." It carries that title to this day! Frost survived captivity and continue d his military career, eventually being promoted to the rank of Major General . He died quietly in England in 1993, at the age of eighty-one.

Lessons: Personal vanity continually haunts military commanders and, after a victory or two, can ensnare the unwary, setting them, and their commands, up for disaster. Makers of daring plans must be careful listeners! Bad news is as important as good news. As Julius Caesar put it, "I fear only half as much my enemies, who hate me, as I do my friends, who flatter me."

Heroes on the ground who "do or die," expertly and enthusias tically executing both good plans and bad ones, deserve credit for making good plans succeed and keeping bad ones from getting worse. Grasseaters are easily identified

and selected for their quality of victimhood. On the other side of the ledger, we have fearlessly claimed our own image and likeness to our Creato r. We proudly claim the title of "Warrior." =80=9CThe Lord is a Warrior." - Exodus, 15:3.

"Not theirs to save the day, but where they stood, falling, to dye the Earth with brave men's blood, for England=80=99s sake and duty Be their names forever sacred among us. Neither praise nor blame add to their epitaph, But let it be... Simple, as that which marked Thermopylae. Tell it in England all those who pass us by, Here in this place, faithful to their charge, faithful to their duty, faithful to the end, her soldiers lie"

Inscription on the Memorial to the Natal Carbineers, Islandlwana, South Africa, Anglo/Zulu War, AD 1879

/John